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 Due Process, Collective Bargaining 
and Section 2(d) of the Charter:  
A Comment on B.C. Health Services
*
 
Jamie Cameron** 
I. THE DEMISE OF PRECEDENT 
The year 2007 marked the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms,1 as well as the 20th anniversary of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decisions in the Labour Trilogy.2 The cases 
comprising the Trilogy — landmarks which held that section 2(d) does 
not protect collective bargaining or the right to strike — gave the 
Charter’s guarantee of associational freedom a confined and 
demoralizing interpretation. At the time, the Labour Trilogy was a 
profound disappointment to those who had hoped that the Charter would 
enlarge the rights of workers.3 Instead, the Court reacted to fears about 
section 2(d)’s implications for labour relations with a confused and 
apprehensive concept of entitlement. Despite failing to establish a 
definition of the right, the Labour Trilogy was determinative; until this 
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Publishing (Toronto: <http://www.lancasterhouse.com>). 
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 Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I would like to thank 
Bernie Adell for commenting on and editing this article, and Michael Lynk for his comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
  See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; Public Service Alliance of Canada 
v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) (comprising the “Labour Trilogy”). 
3
  See, e.g., P. Poirier, “Court dashes labor’s hopes of more rights” The Globe and Mail, 
April 10, 1987, at A1; A. Hutchinson, “Unions have to go political after letdown of the Charter” The 
Globe and Mail, April 16, 1987, at A7; J. Fryer & L. Brown, “Little hope for the workers in rulings 
on Charter” The Globe and Mail, May 20, 1987, at A7. 
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year, the guarantee had virtually no impact on labour relations, nor did it 
protect the entitlement in other settings.4  
By enshrining freedom of association as one of its fundamental 
freedoms, Canada followed the lead of international and European 
human rights instruments. In this, the Charter’s framework filled a gap in 
the much-hallowed Bill of Rights: Canada had the foresight to guarantee 
a right Americans do not explicitly enjoy.5 By making it the equal of the 
Charter’s other guarantees, the text of section 2(d) created an 
opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to develop a distinctive 
concept of associational freedom. Rather than seize the opportunity, the 
Court flinched. To be fair, timing may have been a factor: section 2(d) 
arrived at the Court for the first time in the wake of milestone decisions 
in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,6 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,7 Reference re 
Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) S. 94(2),8 and R. v. Oakes.9 The rights-
protective approach of those cases was out of the question for section 
2(d), where a large and liberal interpretation of the guarantee could 
constitutionalize all human activity except the isolated acts of 
individuals. Especially in light of the formidable standard of justification 
newly in place under R. v. Oakes, such an approach was not an option. 
                                                                                                             
4
  The Court found no breach of s. 2(d) in the Labour Trilogy or in the following cases: R. 
v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Skinner”]; P.I.P.S.C. v. 
Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “PIPSC”]; Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Lavigne”]; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, 
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Egg Marketing Agency”]; Delisle v. Canada 
(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Delisle”]; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Advance Cutting & Coring”]; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]; and Harper v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.). See also Black v. 
Law Society of Alberta, [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Black”] 
(deciding the case under s. 6 rather than s. 2(d)). The two exceptions to this pattern are Libman v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Libman”] (non-labour claim); and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”] (labour claim). 
5
  Section 2 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms … 
(d) freedom of association.” Compare this to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
states, in its entirety: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  
6
  [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
7
  [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
8
  [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle 
Reference”]. 
9
  [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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The Court moved quickly to tether section 2(d)’s guarantee of 
associational freedom, in decisions that placed the spotlight on labour 
policy. 
Against its stated commitment to a generous and purposive approach 
to other Charter guarantees, the Court gave section 2(d) a minimalist 
interpretation. In that regard McIntyre J.’s concurring opinion in the 
Alberta Reference — the Labour Trilogy’s leading decision — was 
indicative. There, he held that constitutionalizing collective efforts 
would privilege groups and organizations over individuals.10 That 
prospect offended an instinct that activities should not have special 
status just because they are initiated by groups.11 This kind of egalitarian 
logic led McIntyre J. to conclude that “[p]eople, by merely combining 
together, cannot create an entity which has greater constitutional rights 
and freedoms than they, as individuals, possess”.12 He found that section 
2(d) protects the right of individuals to form an association, and the right 
of associations to engage in activities, qua associations, but only where 
the activities could lawfully be undertaken by individuals.13 Under that 
definition, section 2(d) did not include actions in the name of the 
association or in aid of the association’s objects.14 
Members of the Court also fretted openly in the Alberta Reference 
that section 2(d) had the potential to destroy labour policy. On behalf of 
three of the panel’s six members, Le Dain J. voiced strong resistance to 
the constitutionalization of such policy.15 In his view, “[t]he rights for 
which constitutional protection are sought … are not fundamental rights 
                                                                                                             
10
  Supra, note 2. This decision was weakened by fragmentation within the panel, which 
comprised only six of the Court’s members. A majority of four dismissed claims that the Charter 
protects collective bargaining and the right to strike, but failed to agree on a definition of 
associational freedom. Justice Le Dain wrote for a plurality of three judges and McIntyre J. wrote a 
separate concurring opinion; Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J. both dissented, and each wrote separate 
reasons. 
11
  Id., at 398. In that case, the rights of the association would exceed those of the individual 
“merely because of the fact of association” (emphasis added). For that reason, McIntyre J. was 
firmly of the view that “[f]reedom of association cannot therefore vest independent rights in the 
group”: id., at 397 (emphasis added).  
12
  Id.  
13
  Under his definition, freedom of association included the right to form an association, 
id., at 407, and “will attach to the exercise in association of such rights as have Charter protection 
when exercised by the individual”, as well as to “the freedom to associate for the purposes of 
activities which are lawful when performed alone”: id., at 409 (emphasis added). 
14
  In PIPSC, supra, note 4, Sopinka J. reworked McIntyre J.’s conception of associational 
freedom and placed it in a four-point framework: infra, note 57. 
15
  Alberta Reference, supra, note 2, at 391. 
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or freedoms … [but] are the creation of legislation”.16 Meanwhile, 
McIntyre J.’s objection to an associational conception of entitlement was 
also rooted in his opposition to judicial intervention in the “dynamic 
process” of labour relations. He bluntly refused to grant unions “an 
economic weapon” which would potentially be immune from legislative 
control.17 These judges feared that a collective conception of association 
might have a domino effect and topple all manner of labour laws. An 
individualistic definition of entitlement which excluded union activities 
from the Charter eliminated that risk.18  
The Labour Trilogy determined the prospects of a guarantee which 
would have little or no vitality in its first 20 years. Without further 
analysis or reflection, freedom of association was reduced to an all-or-
nothing proposition: once having refused to protect freedom of 
association in the context of collective bargaining, the Court decided not 
to protect the entitlement in others.19 As the victories accumulated under 
other Charter provisions, section 2(d) became all but invisible. The 
Court’s definition of associational freedom was so underinclusive over 
the years that claims succeeded on two occasions only, in Libman v. 
Quebec (Attorney General)20 and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General).21  
In the circumstances, few predicted that the Supreme Court of 
Canada would mark the Labour Trilogy’s 20th anniversary by overruling 
its own precedents and announcing in B.C. Health Services that section 
2(d) does protect collective bargaining after all.22 Purely in institutional 
terms, the decision is monumental: the Supreme Court took the extreme 
                                                                                                             
16
  Id. In his view, activities which were recognized as a matter of statutory permission or 
privilege could not be so easily, automatically or immutably transformed by the Charter. 
17
  Id., at 415. 
18
  Id., at 398 (per McIntyre J., who stated that “[c]ollective bargaining is a group concern 
… but the group can exercise only the constitutional rights of its individual members”, and that “[i]f 
the right asserted is not found in the Charter for the individual, it cannot be implied for the group 
merely by the fact of association”). 
19
  The dilemma was that “[i]f s. 2(d) protects only the right to come together and form an 
association, its importance is relatively modest. On the other hand, if it were held also to protect the 
essential activities of the group, it would have enormous impact, particularly in the realm of labour 
relations.” R. Sharpe, K. Swinton & K. Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed. 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002), at 151. Examples include Skinner, Black, Suresh and Harper, supra, 
note 4. 
20
  Supra, note 4. 
21
  Supra, note 4. 
22
  Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
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step of overruling itself.23 Despite effectively doing so on other 
occasions — as, for instance, in R. v. Mills24 and United States of 
America v. Burns25 — the Court has been hesitant to overrule its own 
precedents. Another factor is the McLachlin Court’s decision-making 
tempo, which adds to the intrigue of B.C. Health Services. Many see this 
as a deeply conservative Court, one that is unusually shrewd and 
parsimonious in its use of institutional authority. Yet this same Court has 
an appetite, albeit one that is infrequently indulged, for risky and 
innovative Charter interpretations.26 Predictions about when the judges 
will be moved to act, on which issues, and in what circumstances, are a 
matter of sheer guesswork. 
B.C. Health Services is a case in point.27 Though section 2(d)’s 
prospects brightened after Dunmore v. Ontario, the Court’s decision to 
overrule precedent, constitutionalize collective bargaining, and impose a 
Charter duty to bargain in good faith was radical, to say the least. In 
doing so, the joint majority opinion, written by McLachlin C.J.C. and 
LeBel J., skimmed lightly over a body of case law that had consistently 
been tentative and uneasy about section 2(d). The Labour Trilogy baldly 
exposed the Court’s discomfort with a concept of entitlement that might 
indiscriminately constitutionalize activity of all descriptions, simply 
because it was collective in nature. As well, the Court has been constant 
                                                                                                             
23
  The Court overruled the Labour Trilogy, supra, note 2, as well as PIPSC, supra, note 4. 
For another example of the Court’s overruling itself, albeit one that is less dramatic, see Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 47 
(S.C.C.) (describing the ratio in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J No. 
115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.), as “no longer good law”). 
24
  [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) (essentially overruling the majority 
opinion in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), on the strength of 
“dialogue” between Parliament and the courts). 
25
  [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) (essentially overruling Kindler v. 
Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.) and Reference re 
Ng Extradition (Can.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 64, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.), on the strength of 
changed perceptions of the death penalty). On the subject of same-sex rights, compare M. v. H., 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) and Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 
2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.). 
26
  See Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
(S.C.C.) (invalidating a legislative provision which prohibited access to private health care 
insurance and constitutionalizing the health care system, to some extent, in doing so), and 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (invalidating Parliament’s scheme for the security certificate process). 
27
  Supra, note 22. The Court sat as a panel of seven in B.C. Health Services. Justice 
Charron was not included in the panel, and Rothstein J.’s process of appointment had not been 
completed at the time of the hearing. Six judges signed the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and 
LeBel J., and Deschamps J. wrote separately, in partial dissent. 
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in its aversion to the constitutionalization of labour relations; while 
Dunmore unsettled that pattern, Bastarache J.’s reasons in that case 
carefully avoided dislodging precedent. From the time of the Labour 
Trilogy, those dynamics had conspired to hold section 2(d) at bay. 
Against this backdrop, B.C. Health Services reads as a supremely 
confident decision. In a bold opinion, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. 
easily discounted the concerns that had held section 2(d) jurisprudentially 
in check for so long. Rather than concede the legitimacy of those 
concerns, the Court forged on, waving off the jurisprudence of the first 
20 years on the strength of Dunmore. At the forefront of many questions 
which arise from B.C. Health Services is the decision’s impact on 
collective bargaining, specifically, and on labour relations, more 
generally. A key point for debate concerns the framework that this 
decision has established for public sector bargaining under the Charter. 
That issue invites close attention but should not obscure another, equally 
important, question, which is whether and in what ways the case may 
affect the Court’s conception of associational freedom. The decision to 
overrule precedent created a conceptual hiatus in the section 2(d) 
jurisprudence; what freedom of association means will no longer be 
found in the Labour Trilogy and P.I.P.S.C. v. Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner) but will take its lead, instead, from B.C. Health 
Services. Surely it is odd, in such circumstances, that the Court’s 
decision never ventured beyond the collective bargaining context, and 
expressed no interest in developing a theory of entitlement. 
This article focuses less on the decision’s importance to labour law 
and more on its broader consequences for section 2(d). Specifically, it 
examines the Court’s discussion of associational freedom in the context 
of collective bargaining to see whether the decision offers a theory of 
entitlement for the guarantee. The inquiry follows a trajectory that 
analyzes the key elements of the Court’s methodology: first is the 
creation of due process rights for collective bargaining; second is a 
conception of section 2(d) as a source of positive rights; and third is the 
role of context in constitutional analysis. What emerges from the 
discussion are doubts about the soundness of the doctrines the Court 
relied on to constitutionalize collective bargaining. Those doubts lead to 
the conclusion that B.C. Health Services could have regressive 
consequences for section 2(d) and its promise of associational freedom. 
The article closes with a section which develops that concern by 
pointing out a tension, or ambivalence, that has infused the section 2(d) 
case law from the beginning. The tension is between an interpretation of 
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section 2(d) which is content-dependent and focused on the question of 
labour entitlements, and one which is abstract and more inclusive in its 
view of associational freedom. B.C. Health Services expressed 
disapproval of the Court’s early jurisprudence and its abstract or 
“generic” definition of the guarantee, because it excluded union 
activities from the Charter, and repeatedly noted the superiority of a 
contextual approach. In at least one respect the point is well taken: the 
Labour Trilogy did err in adopting an individualistic conception of a 
collective right. Even so, that point does not render section 2(d)’s 
underlying values and principles irrelevant, and deciding cases by a 
process of serial contextualization is not the answer. 
Though both approaches — the abstract and the contextual — have a 
presence in the jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s section 2(d) 
decision-making in recent years has favoured labour claims.28 B.C. 
Health Services represents the culmination, thus far, of a trend that 
interprets the guarantee primarily, though not exclusively, from that 
perspective. The danger in this is that associational freedom may cease 
to have content and relevance outside the labour law setting. 
It was honest and forthright for the Supreme Court to overrule 
precedents that it now regards as unprincipled. At the least, B.C. Health 
Services and its model for the partial constitutionalization of collective 
bargaining will have enormous consequences for labour relations in this 
country. Meanwhile, the decision to overrule section 2(d)’s founding 
precedents marooned the guarantee; for whatever reason, the Court 
chose not to comment more generally on associational freedom or to 
indicate how it should be interpreted. Accordingly, this article proposes 
that B.C. Health Services be read as the Court seemingly intended — on 
its own terms, as a decision that is specific to the status of collective 
bargaining under the Charter. In other words, B.C. Health Services has 
opened the door to labour claims under section 2(d), without shutting it 
on a reconsideration of section 2(d)’s theoretical underpinnings. Far 
                                                                                                             
28
  See Dunmore and Advance Cutting & Coring, supra, note 4. See also Lavigne, supra, 
note 4 (earlier decision vindicating a union claim under s. 2(d)); R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-
Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (protecting 
secondary picketing at common law, under s. 2(b) Charter values); and U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. 
KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] S.C.J. No. 44, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 (S.C.C.) (protecting leafletting 
activities under s. 2(b) of the Charter). See “Special Section on Labour Law and the Charter” in 
(2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 1 and ff. (suggesting, at 2, that “the Supreme Court of Canada has breathed 
new life into the Charter in its application to labour law”). Meanwhile, non-labour claims have 
consistently been rejected; see Suresh, Harper and (at an earlier point in time) Canadian Egg 
Marketing Agency, supra, note 4. 
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from foreclosing that possibility, the Court’s decision both contemplates 
and invites a re-conceptualization of the guarantee. 
II. SECTION 2(d), DUE PROCESS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
1.  The Constitutionalization of Collective Bargaining 
B.C. Health Services overruled the Labour Trilogy and PIPSC, 
which were the Court’s key decisions on section 2(d) prior to Dunmore.29 
In doing so, the Court explained, in firm but diplomatic terms, that “the 
reasons evoked in the past for holding that the guarantee of freedom of 
association does not extend to collective bargaining can no longer 
stand”.30 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. wrote that Dunmore “opened the 
door to reconsideration of that view”,31 and this observation made it 
relatively painless for them to dispatch previous case law which had 
tenaciously excluded collective bargaining from the Charter. Thus 
emboldened by a single decision — Dunmore — the judges declared that 
“the holdings in the Alberta Reference and PIPSC excluding collective 
bargaining from the scope of s. 2(d) can no longer stand”.32 
Throughout, the joint majority opinion focused singular attention on 
collective bargaining and its status under the Charter, overruling the 
Court’s precedents as a prelude to constructing a due process model of 
collective bargaining under section 2(d). That enterprise led to a 
conclusion that provincial legislation unilaterally altering the terms of 
employment for certain health care workers was invalid because it 
undercut “the right of employees to associate in a process of collective 
action to achieve workplace goals”.33 In defining this right, the joint 
opinion quickly isolated the process for pursuing workplace goals from 
the outcomes of that process and the question of whether those goals 
                                                                                                             
29
  Supra, note 4.  
30
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 22, at para. 20. 
31
  Id., at para. 22. 
32
  Id., at para. 36. 
33
  Id., at para. 19. In the result, the Court upheld ss. 4 and 5, but invalidated ss. 6(2), 6(4) 
and 9 of the Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 2. Sections 4 and 
5, which dealt with relatively minor modifications to schemes for transferring and reassigning 
employees, took these issues off the “collective bargaining table”, but were upheld by the Court. By 
contrast, the sections which dealt with contracting out (i.e., s. 6(2) and (4)), layoffs (i.e., s. 9(a), (b), 
and (c)), and bumping (i.e., s. 9(d)) infringed s. 2(d) because they addressed matters that were 
central to freedom of association and could not be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court 
declared those provisions unconstitutional but suspended its declaration of unconstitutionality for 12 
months. 
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were, in fact, achieved. The result was a model of due process which 
partly constitutionalized collective bargaining, but specifically excluded 
its substantive content from section 2(d).34 The first step in the Court’s 
methodology proposed a definition of the right which was procedural, 
rather than substantive, in nature. In that regard, it is striking that s. 2(d) 
had never before been limited to, or organized around, rights of due 
process. In addition to the decision’s implications for labour relations, 
the broader concern is that B.C. Health Services may have read the 
guarantee down from a substantive, to a procedural, entitlement. 
The Court’s model of due process rights recognized that access to a 
collective bargaining process would not be effective unless “correspon-
ding duties” were imposed on government employers. The second part 
of the joint opinion’s methodology introduced a combination of 
affirmative entitlement and positive obligation: B.C. Health Services 
held that employee associations have the right to engage in collective 
bargaining (except in certain circumstances) and that employers who are 
bound by the Charter have a positive obligation or duty to bargain with 
them in good faith. Here, as in Dunmore, the Court promoted a 
conception of section 2(d) as a source of affirmative entitlements for 
workers. The result was a standard of due process in collective 
bargaining which requires that the state “not substantially interfere with 
the ability of a union to exert meaningful influence over working 
conditions through a process of collective bargaining conducted in 
accordance with the duty to bargain in good faith”.35 Unlike Dunmore, 
which rested on the historical circumstances of agricultural workers, 
B.C. Health Services established a constitutional norm for collective 
bargaining across a broad spectrum. Despite the enormity of that step 
and its consequences for labour relations, the decision’s implications for 
section 2(d) as a whole and for the concept of associational freedom 
under the Charter are uncertain. In that regard, the difficulty is that the 
Court recognized positive duties without explaining what role such 
obligations should play in section 2(d)’s interpretation.  
The third element of the methodology is “context”. As already 
noted, the degree to which it dominated the analysis in B.C. Health 
Services is telling. The Chief Justice and LeBel J. showcased the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
34
  The point was repeated several times: id., at para. 89 (stating that s. 2(d) “does not 
guarantee the particular objectives sought through this associational activity”), and para. 91 
(confirming that “as the right is to a process, it does not guarantee a certain substantive or economic 
outcome”). 
35
  Id., at para. 90. 
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attention to context at every opportunity, and compared their approach in 
B.C. Health Services to the “de-contextualization” for which they faulted 
the earlier jurisprudence.36 Despite providing a fresh perspective on 
collective bargaining, this approach treated context as the key to an 
analysis under section 2(d). In doing so, the joint majority opinion 
showed no awareness that an unabated contextual approach can be 
narrowing, subjective and easily manipulated. For those reasons, the 
Court’s reliance on context invites caution.  
Each of these methodological elements of B.C. Health Services 
supported the constitutionalization of collective bargaining, yet each 
may have regressive consequences for associational freedom under the 
Charter. The next sections of this paper identify those consequences but 
propose that they can be avoided by reading B.C. Health Services as a 
decision that addressed collective bargaining and otherwise left the 
interpretation of section 2(d) to another day. 
2. Due Process Rights under Section 2(d) 
The Court was poised for change in B.C. Health Services, and 
motivated to act by two key factors. First, the status quo, which 
entrenched “a judicial ‘no go’ zone for an entire right”, was no longer 
acceptable to the Court.37 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. concluded that 
the precedents which established this “no go” zone could not be 
sustained. As they explained, the principle of judicial restraint in the 
section 2(d) jurisprudence pushed deference “too far”.38 Second, 
Dunmore v. Ontario enabled the Court to override precedent’s “narrow 
focus on individual activities” and to confirm that activities of an 
“inherently collective” nature are protected by section 2(d).39 A few 
years earlier, Dunmore stood at the brink. Rather than overrule the 
Labour Trilogy, the Court at that time simply deflected its decision away 
from the weight of precedent. In B.C. Health Services the Court took the 
                                                                                                             
36
  Id., at para. 30. 
37
  Id., at para. 26. 
38
  Id. (stating that “to declare a judicial ‘no go’ zone for an entire right on the ground that it 
may involve the courts in policy matters is to push deference too far”). 
39
  Id., at para. 28 (stating that Dunmore “rejected the notion that freedom of association 
applies only to activities capable of performance by individuals”, and adding — after referring to 
Dickson C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent — that “some collective activities may, by their very 
nature, be incapable of being performed by an individual”). 
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definitive step of confronting the Trilogy jurisprudence, and did so in 
Dunmore’s name.  
After rejecting restraint and highlighting Dunmore, the Court 
searched for a way to achieve the partial constitutionalization of 
collective bargaining, and came up with a model of due process under 
section 2(d). The joint opinion carefully stressed that collective 
bargaining as a procedure “has always been distinguishable from its final 
outcomes”, and that it was possible to protect the procedure itself 
“without mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that 
bargaining process”.40 The judges went on to define the entitlement as a 
right of access to a bargaining process that is free from “substantial 
interference” by government employers, who are under a Charter duty to 
meet and bargain in good faith.  
To determine whether section 2(d) has been violated, the Chief 
Justice and LeBel J. proposed a standard which asks “whether the 
process of voluntary, good faith collective bargaining between 
employees and the employer has been, or is likely to be, significantly 
and adversely impacted”.41 Despite this emphasis on access to a process, 
the “substantial interference” test poses substantive questions. For 
instance, the first step of the test considers the relative importance of the 
collective bargaining issue at stake.42 Then, the second step examines the 
state’s conduct, to determine whether the duty to bargain in good faith 
has been met.43 In developing this test, the joint opinion emphasized that 
its criteria are flexible, not rigid, in character. As the judges explained, 
“less central [workplace] matters may be changed more summarily, 
without violating s. 2(d)” and, likewise, “[i]mportant [workplace] 
changes effected through a process of good faith negotiation may not 
violate s. 2(d)”.44 Whether flexible or not, the test drifts beyond the 
purely procedural to incorporate questions of substance. The list of 
exceptions to what section 2(d) requires in public sector collective 
bargaining confirms that the Court’s due process model rests on 
                                                                                                             
40
  Id., at para. 29. 
41
  Id., at para. 92. 
42
  It is evident that the test contemplates a subjective assessment of substantive workplace 
issues; as it stated, “[t]he more important the matter, the more likely that there is substantial 
interference with the s. 2(d) right. Conversely, the less important the matter … the less likely that 
there is substantial interference with the s. 2(d) right to collective bargaining”: id., at para. 95. 
43
  Id., at para. 104.  
44
  Id., at para. 109. 
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substantive foundations; this list includes “essential services, vital state 
administration, clear deadlocks and national crisis”.45 
The degree to which this model will cut a swath through collective 
bargaining practices in the public sector is unknown at present. Much 
will depend on the “substantial interference” test, which makes a right to 
bargain contingent on the substantive importance of the issues at stake, 
as well as on what it means to bargain in good faith in any given 
circumstance. It is also unclear what concrete exceptions the Court had 
in mind under section 2(d) and section 1.46 Even on a conservative 
interpretation, it seems clear that the McLachlin-LeBel model will have 
a major impact on collective bargaining in the public sector. Given that 
prospect, the Court’s procedural conception of associational freedom 
might not seem especially important. But a shift away from the 
assumption that section 2(d), like the other fundamental freedoms, 
guarantees substantive rights should not be overlooked; this could have 
transformative implications for the guarantee. 
In order to confer “at least a measure of protection” on collective 
bargaining, the Court invoked the well-known distinction between 
substance and procedure.47 It is a familiar distinction in the Charter 
jurisprudence, having been invoked initially — and controversially — in 
the Motor Vehicle Reference.48 There, after dismissing the distinction 
between substance and procedure, the Court proposed an interpretation 
of section 7 which went against the intentions of the Charter’s drafters,49 
by authorizing the Court to invalidate legislation that it found 
substantively unfair or unjust.50 Far from receding, the debate about the 
                                                                                                             
45
  Id., at para. 108 (specifically indicating that interference with collective bargaining, 
albeit on an exceptional and typically temporary basis, may be permitted in those situations). See 
R. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia Health Services Case 
and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65 [hereinafter “Charney”] 
(claiming, at 3, that the decision has the potential to result in “a significant interference with 
government economic regulation, and to impose laissez-faire economic principles on the Canadian 
constitutional fabric”). 
46
  B.C. Health Services, id., at para. 107 (discussing situations of exigency and urgency, 
which may affect the scope of the duty under s. 2(d)), and para. 108 (explaining the kinds of 
limitations that may be justified under s. 1). 
47
  Id., at para. 39. 
48
  Supra, note 8. 
49
  Id., at 498 (rejecting the “substance/procedural dichotomy” on the basis that it would 
narrow the issue to an “all-or-nothing proposition” and create difficulties by trying to distinguish 
between concepts with overlapping boundaries), and 508-509 (overriding the intention of the 
Charter’s drafters that the scope of s. 7 be limited to matters of procedure). 
50
  Key examples, in addition to the Motor Vehicle Reference, id., include R. v. 
Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. 
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legitimacy of review — in general and as exemplified by the Court’s 
interpretation of section 7 — continues to this day.51  
The distinction between substance and procedure served a different 
function in B.C. Health Services. There, it enabled the Court to create a 
halfway house between the Labour Trilogy’s “no go” zone for collective 
bargaining and the substantive constitutionalization of labour relations. 
From the perspective of rights claimants, procedural entitlements may be 
less desirable than their substantive counterparts; in B.C. Health 
Services, though, such entitlements marked an improvement on the 
status quo, which had all but shut labour claims out of section 2(d). It 
was inevitable, in the Motor Vehicle Reference, that the Court’s rejection 
of the substance-procedure distinction would widen the scope of section 
7. In B.C. Health Services, similarly, the Court’s reliance on that 
distinction will at least enlarge the scope of section 2(d) as it applies to 
collective bargaining rights. Whether it will expand or contract the 
guarantee in other settings is less clear.  
Prior to B.C. Health Services, there was nothing in the text or history 
of section 2(d) to indicate that its content either included or should be 
limited to matters that are procedural in nature. Not only does the due 
process model run against the accepted interpretation of the guarantee, it 
raises the troubling concern that the Court may have read freedom of 
association “down” from a substantive entitlement to one that is 
procedural in content. Without doubt, that is exactly what B.C. Health 
Services did: the Court expanded section 2(d) to include due process 
rights for collective bargaining but emphatically confirmed, at the same 
time, that substantive entitlements are absolutely and definitively 
excluded from the guarantee.52  
The Court’s procedural conception of entitlement rested on two 
assumptions. The first was that collective bargaining is a procedure,53 
and the second was that collective bargaining had been a “fundamental 
                                                                                                             
No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 
(S.C.C.); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, note 26. 
51
  The Court’s interpretation of s. 7 has generated a significant literature. For criticisms of 
this jurisprudence, see J. Cameron, “The Motor Vehicle Reference and the Relevance of American 
Doctrine in Charter Adjudication” in R. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1987); C. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds., Access to Care: The Legal Debate over Private Health 
Insurance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); and J. Cameron, “From the MVR to 
Chaoulli: The Road Not Taken and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105. 
52
  Supra, notes 34 and 40 and accompanying text. 
53
  B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 29 (S.C.C.) 
(citing the late Bora Laskin). 
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Canadian right”54 and a “fundamental aspect of Canadian society” long 
before the Charter arrived.55 Putting the two together — a procedural 
conception of collective bargaining and a sympathetic rendering of its 
history — led to the conclusion that “[t]he protection enshrined in s. 2(d) 
of the Charter may properly be seen as the culmination of a historical 
movement towards the recognition of a procedural right to collective 
bargaining”.56  
This approach offered strategic advantages. It allowed the Court to 
distance itself from the substantive aspects of collective bargaining and 
sidestep the pesky distinction — deeply entrenched in the section 2(d) 
doctrine — between an association and its activities. That distinction 
found a central place in the pre-Dunmore case law, which held that the 
right to form an association is protected but that the right to engage in 
activities in pursuit of an association’s objects is not — not, at least, 
unless the same activities would be lawful in the case of individuals.57 
This distinction served the important purpose of inhibiting the 
constitutionalization of associational activity across the spectrum.58  
Collective bargaining was no exception. Negotiating the terms and 
conditions of employment is an activity which is aimed at advancing and 
promoting a union’s substantive objects. As such, it was squarely caught 
by the case law’s bright-line distinction between an individual’s right to 
form or join an association and the activities of the association as a 
collective enterprise. The challenge in B.C. Health Services was to 
protect the associational activities of labour unions without conferring 
constitutional status on collective activities more generally. As well, any 
concession that the activities of an association are constitutionally 
protected would have required the Court to include Canadian Egg 
Marketing Agency v. Richardson59 and Delisle v. Canada60 in its purge of 
                                                                                                             
54
  Id., at para. 40. 
55
  Id., at para. 41. 
56
  Id., at para. 68. 
57
  Though the Labour Trilogy introduced the distinction, its consequences were formalized 
in PIPSC’s four-point framework. The four propositions are: first, that s. 2(d) protects the freedom 
to establish, belong to and maintain an association; second, that s. 2(d) does not protect an activity 
solely on the ground that the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of an association; third, 
that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of 
individuals; and fourth, that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the lawful rights of 
individuals. PIPSC, [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 402 (S.C.C.).  
58
  See Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 
(S.C.C.) and Delisle, [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) (applying the PIPSC 
framework to defeat the s. 2(d) claim in each instance). 
59
  Id. 
60
  Supra, note 58. 
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precedent. Both of those decisions relied on the distinction between an 
association and its activities to defeat claims under section 2(d).61 
Despite that distinction’s foundational role in the section 2(d) 
jurisprudence, B.C. Health Services came close to abandoning the 
definitional boundary the Court had drawn between an association and 
its activities. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. observed that “it will 
always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular activity in 
concert with others as the ‘object’ of [an] association”, and therefore 
outside section 2(d)’s purview under the Labour Trilogy jurisprudence.62 
To avoid this problem, the judges responded with a distinction of their 
own, one that separated the associational element — re-characterized as 
procedural — from the activity itself, which seeks certain substantive 
results.63 Reformulating collective bargaining as a procedure rather than 
a substantive activity did little to solve the problem, however, because 
other forms of associational activity seem equally “procedural”. In other 
words, it is difficult to see why collective bargaining is procedural but 
other associational activities, once divorced from their substantive 
objects, are not. 
The Court did not explain the difference between the process of 
collective bargaining and the processes engaged in by other associations, 
but neither did it overrule Canadian Egg Marketing Agency or Delisle. 
That could not be done without de-legitimizing virtually all of its pre-
                                                                                                             
61
  In Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. held that producers 
from the Northwest Territories, who complained about their exclusion from an egg marketing 
scheme, had confused an activity foundational to the association with an association foundational to 
an activity. The joint opinion stated that activity which is foundational to an association is excluded 
from s. 2(d), but that an association which is foundational to an activity is not. In other words, 
s. 2(d) includes an individual’s initial right to associate and then stops; the rights of associations do 
not exist and s. 2(d) does not protect any of an association’s activities, no matter how foundational. 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency cited the PIPSC framework and confirmed that s. 2(d) does not 
extend to activities just because individuals form an association to carry on those activities. 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, supra, note 58, at 227-28 and 232. Justice Bastarache’s 
subsequent majority opinion in Delisle affirmed the endorsement of PIPSC in Canadian Egg 
Marketing Agency, and applied conventional analysis to defeat the s. 2(d) claim yet again. In 
Delisle, he found that freedom of association implies only that activities which employees can carry 
on as individuals cannot be prohibited when individuals organize themselves into associations; in 
the result, the RCMP “can very well set all working conditions for its members without violating 
s. 2(d)”. Delisle, supra, note 58, at paras. 11 and 36 (emphasis added). 
62
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 29 (stating, as well, that “[r]ecasting 
collective bargaining as an ‘object’ begs the question of whether or not the activity is worthy of 
constitutional protection”). 
63
  Id., at para. 32 (citing Dunmore and Canadian Egg Marketing Agency for the proposition 
that “only the ‘associational aspect’ of an activity and not the activity itself [is] protected under 
s. 2(d)”). 
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Dunmore jurisprudence and embarrassing Bastarache J., who wrote the 
majority opinion in both of those cases. Given that quandary, the 
substance-procedure distinction allowed the Court to obfuscate its 
decision to constitutionalize the activities of unions by highlighting the 
“procedural” history of collective bargaining in Canada. At least for the 
time being, this avoided an interpretation of section 2(d) that would 
constitutionalize the activities of all associations in all circumstances.  
Perhaps B.C. Health Services will be read as a decision that confers 
due process rights on collective bargaining because of the particular role 
which that activity has played in labour relations over time. In other 
words, it may not follow from the creation of process rights in these 
circumstances that section 2(d)’s substantive entitlement will be read 
down in other settings. But it is also possible to read B.C. Health 
Services as a decision that potentially re-classifies all associational 
activities, and not just collective bargaining, as procedural in nature; on 
that view, the decision could dramatically widen the scope of 
entitlement. However, such a prospect is unlikely, so it remains a 
concern that the Court may now use B.C. Health Services to downgrade 
section 2(d) from a substantive to a procedural entitlement in other 
cases.  
The Court’s interpretation of section 2(d) was grounded in its 
perception of what was required to protect collective bargaining under 
the Charter. Further evidence that the Court tailored section 2(d) to the 
requirements of collective bargaining can be found in its creation of an 
affirmative right to bargain and in its imposition on government 
employers of a duty to negotiate in good faith. 
3. Affirmative Entitlements and Positive Obligations 
Had the Labour Trilogy, PIPSC, and Delisle applied, the legislation 
at stake in B.C. Health Services would have been upheld. In each of 
those cases, the Court found that the right remained intact, though unions 
were excluded from a “statutory platform” for collective bargaining, 
because the freedom to associate existed “independently of any statutory 
regime”.64 Likewise, despite complaining that the statute violated section 
2(d) by denying them access to the bargaining process, British 
Columbia’s health care workers also remained free to associate. In the 
meantime, and without committing the Court to a position on collective 
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  Delisle, supra, note 58, at paras. 31, 33. 
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bargaining, Dunmore had articulated an affirmative entitlement to 
meaningful association and had imposed a positive obligation on the 
government to advance its exercise.65 Though limited to the 
circumstances of agricultural workers who were historically unable to 
form effective associations, Dunmore provided the template for an 
alternative interpretation of section 2(d). The result was the decision in 
B.C. Health Services, which granted health care workers a positive right 
to bargain and imposed a duty on the government employer to bargain in 
good faith.  
In order to avoid open conflict with Delisle, the decision in Dunmore 
set a high threshold for the positive obligation it imposed. The workers 
in Dunmore won because the hardship they had suffered in trying to 
exercise their associational freedom distinguished their circumstances 
from those of the RCMP.66 In discussing Dunmore, the joint opinion in 
B.C. Health Services noted that to establish a breach of section 2(d) 
“[t]here must be evidence that the freedom would be next to impossible 
to exercise without positively recognizing a right of access to a statutory 
regime”.67 Only a few pages later, the Court set aside the “next to 
impossible” threshold and relied, instead, on the language of “substantial 
interference”.68 In B.C. Health Services the resulting standard has two 
parts: on the entitlement side, the relative importance of the bargaining 
issue determines whether there is an affirmative right to bargain; and on 
the obligation side, the question is whether the employer has met its duty 
to bargain in good faith.69 As the Chief Justice and LeBel J. explained, 
the interference must “seriously undercut or undermine” the collective 
                                                                                                             
65
  [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 67 (S.C.C.) (stating that the province 
was constitutionally obligated to create “at a minimum a regime that provides agricultural workers 
with the protection necessary for them to exercise their constitutional freedom to form and maintain 
associations”).  
66
  Id., at para. 41 (comparing their relative circumstances and stating that “[i]t is no wonder 
… that agricultural workers have failed to associate in any meaningful way in Ontario, while RCMP 
officers have successfully created independent employee associations in several provinces across 
Canada”). 
67
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 34 (emphasis added). 
68
  In Dunmore, Bastarache J. had stated that those who claim positive obligations in cases 
under s. 2 must prove that the fundamental freedom was rendered “impossible to exercise” and went 
on, in the same paragraph, to add that claimants must demonstrate that “exclusion from a statutory 
regime permits a substantial interference with the exercise of protected s. 2(d) activity” (emphasis in 
original): Dunmore, supra, note 65, at para. 25. In other words, substantial interference is proved 
when it has become “next to impossible” to exercise the right. 
69
  Here, as well, the Court acknowledged the subjectivity of this exercise, noting that 
“[d]ifferent situations may demand different processes and timelines”: B.C. Health Services, supra, 
note 53, at para. 107.  
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bargaining process, and can include “union breaking” as well as “[a]cts 
of bad faith, or unilateral nullification of negotiated terms, without any 
process of meaningful discussion and consultation … ”.70  
In this way, the joint opinion proposed a standard which rests on 
subjective assessments of substantive matters, and which may for that 
reason be difficult to apply in an even-handed manner. Beyond the 
context of collective bargaining, it is worth reflecting on the role of 
affirmative entitlements and positive obligations in Charter analysis. It 
will seem to many that this double-barrelled entitlement marks a 
progressive step in the evolution of rights-protective Charter doctrines. 
Despite that impression, it remains the case that affirmative entitlements 
and positive obligations are the exception rather than the rule under the 
Charter.  
Over the years, there has been much debate about the imposition of 
positive duties on government under the Charter, especially (though not 
exclusively) where there are fiscal implications or where a remedy 
threatens judicial interference in matters of democratic governance.71 In 
light of that debate, it is striking that the Court’s opinion in B.C. Health 
Services created significant entitlements without discussing the 
institutional burdens that are inherent in its model of due process rights. 
In this, the decision is quite unlike Dunmore, which concerned a single 
category of workers whose situation was rooted in circumstances that 
could not be easily generalized or analogized to other settings. Dunmore 
imposed institutional burdens which were significant, but discrete.72 By 
contrast, B.C. Health Services set up a framework which is designed to 
apply to collective bargaining across the public sector. Though the costs 
of this due process model cannot be quantified, it is clear that the Court’s 
collective bargaining scheme will impose substantial burdens on public 
sector employers.73 
                                                                                                             
70
  Id., at para. 92. 
71
  In recent years the Court has consistently rejected arguments in favour of the existence 
of positive obligations: see e.g., Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.); Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.); and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
72
  In choosing a remedy, the Court stated that “at minimum the statutory freedom to 
organize … ought to be extended to agricultural workers, along with the protections judged essential 
to its meaningful exercise”, and that the remedy granted neither required nor forbade the inclusion 
of agricultural workers in a full collective bargaining regime: Dunmore, supra, note 65, at paras. 67 
and 68.  
73
  See Charney, supra, note 45. 
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B.C. Health Services recognized certain exceptions to the scope of 
collective bargaining rights under section 2(d), but found that they did 
not apply to the case at hand. For instance, the government had argued, 
in attempting to justify the legislation, that the statute was “a crucial 
element of its response to a pressing health care crisis, [which was] 
necessary and important to the well-being of British Columbians”.74 
Earlier, the Court had allowed a province to roll back pay equity 
entitlements, in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., where the 
costs of enforcing Charter rights were quantified and were found, in 
consequence, to impose an undue burden on the government.75 Yet in 
B.C. Health Services, the province’s claim that the health care system 
was in fiscal crisis found no purchase.76 In rejecting that claim, the Court 
inferred that British Columbia’s legislation to amend the terms of 
employment for health care workers was motivated by suspect, cost-
cutting objectives.77  
There is another problem with a conception of section 2(d) as a 
source of positive rights. As Baier v. Alberta shows, this approach to 
entitlement permits a regressive interpretation of fundamental Charter 
freedoms.78 In that case, in a decision released a couple of weeks after 
B.C. Health Services, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality, under section 2(b), of legislation which effectively 
banned school board employees from running for office as school 
district trustees.79 Though Rothstein J.’s majority opinion characterized 
the prohibition as a “blanket restriction”, it did not treat the statutory 
provision as an interference with expressive freedom which singled out 
one class of candidates for disqualification from office.80 Rather than 
follow the consistent pattern of the section 2(b) jurisprudence, which sets 
a low standard for breach and resolves the question of limits under 
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  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at para. 3. 
75
  Supra, note 71. 
76
  The joint opinion stated that “[i]t is true that the government was facing a situation of 
exigency”, “was determined to come to grips with the spiralling costs of health care”, and was 
fuelled in this determination “by the laudable desire to provide quality health services to the people 
of British Columbia”. The Court held, however, that the measures adopted constituted a “virtual 
denial” of s. 2(d) rights. B.C. Health Services, supra, note 53, at paras. 134 and 135. 
77
  Id., at para. 147. 
78
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.). 
79
  In the wake of a labour dispute, the province enacted the School Trustee Statutes 
Amendment Act, 2002, S.A. 2002, c. 23, s. 1(2)(a), which banned school employees from running 
for school board office. 
80
  Baier v. Alberta, supra, note 78, at para. 7. 
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section 1, Rothstein J. redefined the issue. He found that school board 
employees who were barred from office by the legislation were pressing 
an affirmative entitlement, in the form of access to a “statutory 
platform”.81 After classifying the claim as a positive right and noting that 
section 2(b) is reserved for negative entitlements, Rothstein J. applied 
the Dunmore criteria.82 There was no interference with expressive 
freedom, he said, because employees who were disqualified from school 
board positions remained free to engage in expressive activities.83  
It is worth noting that the jurisprudence had once given the same 
answer to workers who complained that excluding their unions from 
statutory collective bargaining schemes violated section 2(d). Prior to 
B.C. Health Services, in cases like PIPSC and Delisle, the Court 
responded that the workers’ right to associate was unaffected because it 
existed independently of the statute, and that nothing in the legislation 
prevented individuals from forming or establishing associations on their 
own initiative. While B.C. Health Services overruled that line of 
thinking, it quickly reappeared in a slightly different context in Baier.  
Although further discussion must be deferred to another day, Baier 
confirms — for purposes of this article — that Dunmore’s “next to 
impossible” threshold has gained a foothold in at least some other 
settings.84 More specifically, Baier shows how section 2(d)’s restrictive 
criteria have negatively influenced the interpretation of section 2(b). 
That may be why Fish J.’s dissent in Baier claimed that it would be 
“most ironic for the Court’s generous interpretation of freedom of 
association under s. 2(d) in Dunmore to now be invoked here for the 
purpose of narrowing the Court’s traditionally broad interpretation of the 
historically and conceptually distinct freedom of expression guaranteed 
by s. 2(b)”.85 Thus, Baier serves as a warning to beware of positive 
rights: a narrowly drawn positive right, like that found in Dunmore, can 
look promising, only to be applied to restrict the scope of entitlement 
and uphold limits on the Charter’s fundamental freedoms, without the 
                                                                                                             
81
  Id., at para. 36. The concept of a “statutory platform” references a distinction between 
claims that are legitimately rooted in the Charter’s fundamental freedoms, and those which 
otherwise seek access to a statutory platform. 
82
  Id., at para. 20 (stating that “s. 2 generally imposes a negative obligation on government 
rather than a positive obligation of protection or assistance”). 
83
  Id., at para. 48 (stating that, “absent inclusion in this statutory scheme”, employees have 
not shown that they are “unable to express themselves on education issues”). 
84
  Id., at para. 30 and ff. (identifying and applying the criteria to the facts). 
85
  Id., at para. 100 (emphasis in original). 
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necessity of a section 1 analysis. The concern is that what happened to 
section 2(b) in Baier can also happen to section 2(d).86  
In infusing the guarantee with procedural content and following 
Dunmore’s lead on positive rights, B.C. Health Services gave section 
2(d) a novel interpretation. Yet instead of grounding the framework of 
collective bargaining in a conception of what associational freedom 
means, the Court launched into a context-dependent discussion of labour 
relations and collective bargaining. By focusing so closely on context, 
the Court lost contact with the guarantee’s contours and produced 
criteria which are overly customized to a single setting.  
4. In Praise of Context 
Context is valued and abstraction is not. The Court followed that 
pattern of thought in B.C. Health Services by dismissing its earlier 
section 2(d) decisions as unprincipled. According to the joint opinion, 
the Labour Trilogy jurisprudence erred in conceptualizing associational 
freedom as an abstract entitlement. In particular, the joint opinion 
declared that the decontextualized approach of earlier decisions 
compared poorly with the “purposive approach taken to other Charter 
guarantees”.87 In other words, an abstract definition of the right is not 
purposive. Such a “generic” approach, as the joint opinion termed it, had 
regrettably caused the Court in early cases to overlook the context of 
collective bargaining and its importance to the exercise of associational 
freedom in labour relations.88 In this, B.C. Health Services provided a 
critique of precedent which set up Dunmore as a revelation in 
methodology. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. announced that 
Dunmore had “correctly advocated a more contextual analysis” and 
conducted “a more contextual assessment than found in the early s. 2(d) 
cases”.89 The judges also praised Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion in 
                                                                                                             
86
  Note that in Delisle, which was not overruled, the Court stated that s. 2 of the Charter 
“generally requires only that the state not interfere”, that “except perhaps in exceptional 
circumstances, freedom of expression requires only that Parliament not interfere”, and that “the 
same is true for freedom of association”: supra, note 58, at paras. 25 and 27. 
87
  B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 283 D.L.R. (4th) 40, at para. 30 (S.C.C.). 
88
  Id. 
89
  Id., at para. 33 (emphasis added). 
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Advance Cutting & Coring for anticipating the contextual approach and 
its emergence under section 2(d).90 
A focus on context in B.C. Health Services served the Court’s 
purpose of finding a way to constitutionalize collective bargaining. 
Without commenting on what the Court said about collective bargaining 
in Canada, this article questions a methodology which undertakes a 
quixotic search for the pedigree of entitlements, and looks to the broader 
implications of an approach that is heavily weighted toward a judicial 
appreciation of “context”. In that regard, the section 2(b) jurisprudence 
demonstrates that a contextual approach has merits, as well as serious 
drawbacks. 
In doctrinal terms, this approach dates from Wilson J.’s sole 
concurring judgment in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney 
General).91 There, she complained that the Court’s interpretation of 
section 2(b) privileged an abstract conception of expressive freedom. 
She called for a contextualization of the entitlement which would engage 
the balancing of interests that must occur before justifiable limits can be 
found. After Edmonton Journal, the concept quickly evolved into a 
methodology for upholding limits under section 1 on “low value” 
expressive activities.92 This version of the contextual approach reached 
its apex in the late 1990s, with the Court’s decision in R. v. Lucas.93  
Though the doctrinal cast of this approach has been modified, 
context has retained its vitality in the section 2(b) jurisprudence.94 It has 
been deployed in recent cases to save limits on political expression, even 
                                                                                                             
90
  Id. Throughout, the joint opinion treaded carefully around the Bastarache J. 
jurisprudence under s. 2(d). The Chief Justice and LeBel J. heaped praise on Bastarache J.’s 
majority opinion in Dunmore and, in doing so, managed to spare him the embarrassment of 
overruling his majority opinion in Delisle. 
91
  [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). 
92
  See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.); R. v. Butler, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.); Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.); R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion by La Forest J.); and R. v. 
Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.). See generally J. Cameron, “The Past, 
Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 
[hereinafter “Cameron”] (providing an analysis and critique of the contextual approach and its use 
as a doctrinal tool to uphold limits on expression that is deemed to be of low value). 
93
  Id. There, the Court applied a “low-value analysis” to discount the expression at stake 
and to uphold the Criminal Code’s (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46) defamatory libel provisions. 
94
  See Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]; Harper, [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Bryan”]. 
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when the evidence failed to demonstrate that expressive activities were 
harmful.95 From a certain perspective, using context to uphold limits on 
high-value expression is more regressive than using it to withhold 
protection from objectionable or low-value expression. In any case, the 
jurisprudence reveals that a contextual approach has been consistently 
applied to restrict the scope of section 2(b), not to expand it.96 
In light of that experience, two concerns arise from the Court’s 
reliance on context in B.C. Health Services. The first is that under this 
approach, the question of breach under section 2(d) is entirely contingent 
on shifting perceptions of context. For instance, whether collective 
bargaining is protected by the Charter turned on the Court’s reading of 
history, which could have supported any number of interpretations. In 
principle, the use of history to validate the constitutional status of an 
entitlement sets a dangerous precedent. Not only is the interpretation of 
history a notoriously subjective project, it is one that ordinarily will not 
generate progressive insights into the scope of entitlement.97 A key 
difficulty in consulting history to determine the constitutional status of a 
particular activity is that materials can be selectively sourced and cited to 
advance or set back a claim; consequently, it is unreliable as a 
methodology. That history emerged in B.C. Health Services as the 
mainstay of the analysis does not augur well for other entitlements, 
which will be contingent on the Court’s rendering of histories as well as 
on contested perceptions of events. 
Second, an approach that is exclusively contextual compromises the 
fundamentals of constitutional interpretation. Essentially, B.C. Health 
Services dismissed the earlier section 2(d) jurisprudence because it 
rested on a theory of entitlement which was abstract and flawed for that 
reason. This interpretation reveals a misapprehension of the cases, which 
demonstrate that the Court’s interpretation of associational freedom 
should draw its strength from section 2(d)’s underlying values. The 
interpretation which emerged in the Labour Trilogy line of cases can be 
challenged, and was challenged in B.C. Health Services, for its 
                                                                                                             
95
  See Harper (acknowledging that harm had not been established, but nonetheless 
upholding third-party spending limits), and Bryan (upholding limits on the publication of election 
results, again in the absence of evidence of harm): id.  
96
  But see Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 94. 
97
  As Lamer J. explained in the Motor Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 486, at 509 (S.C.C.), “[i]f the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have the 
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials 
… do not stunt its growth”.  
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misguided reliance on an individualistic approach to inherently 
collective activity. While the concept of entitlement in those cases was 
flawed, the Court’s methodology was not. Unless section 2(d) is to be 
restricted in scope to what is purely contextual, the guarantee must have 
an abstract definition which is rooted in associational freedom’s 
underlying values. Ironically, B.C. Health Services is the converse of 
what Wilson J. complained of in Edmonton Journal: in place of a 
definition that privileged abstract values at the expense of their 
contextual setting, B.C. Health Services chose an alternative that 
privileged context at the expense of an abstract or conceptual foundation 
for the guarantee.  
When B.C. Health Services overruled precedent, section 2(d)’s 
conceptual foundation all but collapsed. Yet in taking this dramatic step, 
the Court did little to create a new foundation for the guarantee.98 
Instead, the decision was so dependent on the context of collective 
bargaining that the guarantee’s abstract content and underlying values 
were effectively excluded from the analysis. The Court endorsed the 
proposition that section 2(d) protects collective activities, but limited its 
observations and reflections on associational freedom to the labour law 
context. 
5. Regressive Consequences  
This part of the article considers what the constitutionalization of 
collective bargaining implies for section 2(d). As shown above, the 
Court combined existing doctrines and concepts to create a new model 
of rights under this guarantee. While this methodology promoted one 
category of collective activity — labour negotiations — it did not 
advance a purposive interpretation of associational freedom. For 
example, characterizing collective bargaining as a process allowed the 
Court to dodge the distinction between an association and its activities. 
In the face of a consistent line of authority that made it awkward to 
protect associational activity, re-describing labour negotiations as a 
process or procedure appeared to present a solution. Thus, the Court in 
B.C. Health Services customized its interpretation of section 2(d) to meet 
the requirements of collective bargaining. The risk is that a solution that 
                                                                                                             
98
  Compare Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at paras. 16 and 17 
(S.C.C.), which discussed the status of collective activity under s. 2(d), but did so without explicitly 
disapproving of or overruling authorities that advanced an individualistic conception of the right. 
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is expressly context-dependent in design might be unthinkingly applied 
to section 2(d) claims in other, dissimilar settings.  
To suggest, for instance, that the decision redefined all associational 
activity as a process, which can be distinguished from its substantive 
objects and outcomes, would obliterate the doctrinal distinction between 
an association and its activity. Reading B.C. Health Services in this way 
would radically enlarge the scope of section 2(d). However, in the 
absence of indication that the Court views associational activity as 
inherently procedural, it is more likely that section 2(d)’s due process 
rights for collective bargaining will narrow the scope of the guarantee. 
Not only could the content of associational freedom be transformed from 
substantive to procedural, the new due process rights would be available 
only where the additional criteria set out in B.C. Health Services are met. 
As indicated, the context and substantial interference elements of the 
analysis set a high threshold for breach, which might not be easily 
satisfied in other settings. 
Paradoxically, the Court’s enforcement of positive rights and duties 
might also have adverse consequences for associational freedom. As 
noted above, positive rights and obligations are usually seen as 
exceptional in nature — especially, in the Court’s view, under section 2 
— and are available only in prescribed circumstances. Despite 
recognizing an entitlement, Dunmore and B.C. Health Services 
established criteria which may be applied restrictively, thereby limiting 
the scope of section 2(d) and other fundamental Charter freedoms to the 
rare or exceptional case when positive rights can be found and duties 
imposed. Already, Baier v. Alberta has demonstrated how Dunmore can 
be twisted to re-frame a negative entitlement in positive terms and 
eliminate a claim from the Charter. As shown above, the Court in Baier 
applied Dunmore’s narrow criteria for positive rights to countermand an 
established line of authority and rationalize a regressive interpretation of 
section 2(b). A concept of positive rights which worked for agricultural 
workers in Dunmore and collective bargaining in B.C. Health Services 
has a dark side, and a documented potential to deny rights which would 
have been recognized under a traditional conception of negative 
entitlement.  
Finally, a contextual approach allowed the Court in B.C. Health 
Services to establish the pedigree of collective bargaining. A warning is 
likewise in order on that feature of the decision’s methodology. That 
“context” is inherently malleable has largely been its strength but, thus 
far, this approach has been more rights-constraining than rights-
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enhancing. At least under section 2(b) — and under section 15 as well 
— context has been invoked to deny, rather than to validate, 
entitlement.99 In B.C. Health Services, the Court’s survey of collective 
bargaining history led to an expansion of rights under section 2(d); as 
has been observed, however, history is more frequently invoked to 
narrow than to enlarge the scope of entitlement. For all the praise it 
attracted in B.C. Health Services, the contextual approach has done as 
much, or more, to limit Charter rights and freedoms than it has to protect 
them.  
Singling out one aspect of associational activity for constitutionali-
zation, purely on the basis of its context, does not advance section 2(d)’s 
purposes, nor does it ground decision-making in principles of 
constitutional interpretation. B.C. Health Services relied on a concept of 
entitlement that was so heavily and exclusively contextualized to 
collective bargaining that the decision lost contact with the underlying 
values which have anchored section 2(d) since the Labour Trilogy. As a 
matter of constitutional interpretation, the risk is that by over-
contextualizing the guarantee to labour relations issues, the Court may 
deny section 2(d) a generous and purposive interpretation which would 
allow it to take its place among the Charter’s other rights and freedoms. 
To summarize, the Court’s due process model of collective 
bargaining may have regressive consequences for section 2(d) and other 
fundamental freedoms. It should be emphasized that B.C. Health 
Services spoke explicitly to the circumstances of collective bargaining, 
and did not address the “generic” meaning of the guarantee or suggest 
how it ought to be interpreted. Significantly, there is no indication that 
the Court intended its decision in B.C. Health Services to have negative 
consequences for associational freedom, and none should therefore be 
assumed. In developing its due process model for collective bargaining, 
the Court said nothing that would compromise section 2(d)’s prospects 
in other settings. To the contrary, B.C. Health Services took a vital step 
in renewing the promise this guarantee held out so many years ago, 
before the Labour Trilogy was decided. From that perspective, the better 
view is that B.C. Health Services should be read as a decision which is 
limited to collective bargaining, and which has otherwise left the 
challenge of redefining associational freedom to another day.  
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  In the case of s. 2(b), see supra, notes 92-94; in the case of s. 15, see Law v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) 
(adopting a four-part contextual approach to interpretation of the guarantee, which has made it 
extremely difficult for claimants to establish a breach of equality rights). 
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The following comments reflect briefly on that larger project. Within 
the limits of this article, the discussion can do no more than frame some 
of the issues which call for fresh consideration.  
III. A THEORY OF ENTITLEMENT 
In B.C. Health Services, the Court opened up section 2(d) for the 
first time, essentially, since the Labour Trilogy, but did so without 
committing itself to a theory of entitlement. For that reason the Court 
should not be quick to extend concepts which were designed to address 
labour questions — and which may work in that setting — to other 
issues of associational freedom. Nor should it be assumed that section 
2(d) is “reserved” for labour claims. Rather, B.C. Health Services should 
be read as a signal that the Court may now be ready to allow freedom of 
association to come into its own as one of the Charter’s fundamental 
freedoms. It is encouraging that B.C. Health Services has provided a 
fresh opportunity to rethink the “value added” of a textual guarantee that 
is dedicated to the protection of associational freedom. In doing so, it is 
useful to reflect on the first 20 years of section 2(d) jurisprudence, and to 
consider the lessons of that history.  
From the outset, co-existing conceptions of associational freedom 
could be found in the jurisprudence. Under one view, section 2(d) had 
special, or nearly exclusive, significance for the rights of workers. There 
were skeptics, too, but many saw the Charter as a potentially 
transformative force for labour relations. In part because much of the 
jurisprudence addressed claims that pressed for the protection of union 
activities under the Charter, labour issues have been dominant in the 
literature on section 2(d).100 Generally, this literature is critical of the 
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  Virtually all of the secondary literature on s. 2(d) debates its implications for labour 
relations. A short and selective list of articles discussing the Charter and labour relations includes 
P. Cavalluzzo, “Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively” in J.M. Weiler & 
R.M. Elliot, eds. Litigating the Values of a Nation (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); P. Gall, “Freedom of 
Association and Trade Unions: A Double-Edged Sword” in Weiler & Elliot, id.; B. Etherington, 
“Freedom of Association and Compulsory Union Dues: Towards a Purposive Conception of a 
Freedom Not to Associate” (1987) 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 1; H. Arthurs, “‘The Right to Golf’: 
Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and the Rest of Us under the Charter” (1988) 13 
Queen’s L.J. 17; J. Fudge, “Labour, the New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism” (1988) 13 
Queen’s L.J. 61; D. Beatty, “Labouring outside the Charter” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J 839; 
P. Weiler, “The Charter at Work: Reflections on the Constitutionalizing of Labour and Employment 
Law” (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117; B. Etherington, “Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U.: Moving Toward or Away 
From a Freedom Not to Associate” (1991) 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 533; J. Cameron, “The ‘Second 
Labour Trilogy’: A Comment on R. v. Advance Cutting, Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v. 
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Labour Trilogy’s refusal to constitutionalize collective bargaining and 
the right to strike; despite offering an inconclusive set of opinions, these 
decisions led to negative outcomes for organized labour in PIPSC and 
Delisle, and otherwise stifled the development of a vibrant jurisprudence.101  
Yet the results were not as one-sided as some suppose: labour unions 
won significant victories in key decisions which tested the principle of 
non-association. In Lavigne and again in Advance Cutting & Coring, the 
Court departed from an individualist conception of the right, to protect 
union interests from those who sought to be free from compelled 
association with unions and their causes.102 Though the Labour Trilogy 
and its progeny relied on an individualistic definition of the right to 
exclude collective bargaining and the right to strike from the Charter, 
these two decisions applied a collective conception of association — 
either in interpreting section 2(d) or in applying Oakes — to defeat 
challenges to mandatory dues check-off for non-workplace activities, 
and to compulsory union membership as a condition of employment.103 
More recently, the McLachlin Court has steadily advanced the interests 
                                                                                                             
Pepsi-Cola” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 68; J. Fudge, “‘Labour Is Not a Commodity’: The Supreme 
Court of Canada and the Freedom of Association” (2004) 67 Sask. L. Rev. 425 [hereinafter “Labour 
Is Not a Commodity”]; and D. Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter” (2002) 40 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 387.  
For articles on s. 2(d) which do not focus on labour relations, see J. Cameron, “Back to 
Fundamentals: Multidisciplinary Partnerships and Freedom of Association under s. 2(d)” (2000) 50 
U.T.L.J. 261; C. Sheppard, “Intimacy, Rights and the Parent-Child Relationship: Rethinking 
Freedom of Association in Canada” (2004) 16 N.J.C.L. 103; and K. Norman, “Freedom of 
Association” in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th 
ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2005), c. 7. 
101
  See supra, notes 2 and 4. 
102
  Lavigne, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.); Advance Cutting & Coring, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.). 
103
  In Lavigne, for example, La Forest J. upheld the use by unions of mandatory dues for 
non-collective bargaining purposes under s. 1, because allowing employees to opt out could 
seriously undermine unionism’s financial base and membership, as well as “undermine the spirit of 
solidarity which is so important to the emotional and symbolic underpinnings of unionism”. Id., at 
336-37. Subsequently, the Court’s decision in Advance Cutting & Coring upheld compulsory union 
membership as a condition of employment in Quebec’s construction industry. Four members of the 
Court found that such a condition did not violate s. 2(d). For instance, LeBel J. held that inner limits 
and restrictions should be read into any concept of non-association to ensure that individuals are not 
denied the benefits of collective activities. To avoid treating the guarantee as “an inferior right, 
barely tolerated and narrowly circumscribed”, LeBel J. endorsed mandatory membership as a way 
of advancing the union’s self-actualization through its “group voice” and “common strength”. Id., at 
para. 208. 
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of unions under the Charter in cases which include Dunmore, Pepsi-
Cola104 and now B.C. Health Services. 
From the beginning, members of the Court offered a second 
perspective on section 2(d), which undertook to identify section 2(d)’s 
underlying values and to define the scope of the right in abstract terms. 
In doing so, these judges applied the same approach to associational 
freedom that was followed in interpreting other guarantees, such as those 
in sections 2(a) and (b), 7 and 15.105 Accordingly, while Le Dain J.’s 
Alberta Reference reasons provided a definition of sorts and dismissed 
the claim in four curt paragraphs, McIntyre J. and Dickson C.J.C. wrote 
at length about the nature of associational freedom. An abstract or 
conceptual approach led McIntyre J. to conclude that rights of 
association under section 2(d) must be defined in the same way as 
individual rights. His reliance on the same-treatment principle avoided a 
double standard which would have allowed groups and organizations to 
claim special rights and privileges under the Charter.  
By comparison, Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference 
showed how an abstract definition of associational freedom could 
promote a generous and purposive interpretation of the right. He 
disputed McIntyre J.’s analysis, and proposed a definition that reflected 
the distinctive features and needs of associational activity. Chief Justice 
Dickson remonstrated that conceiving of section 2(d) as an individual 
right stripped it of content and meaning. He also resisted an 
interpretation that read the guarantee down, by treating inherently 
collective activity as a mere derivative of individual action — an 
interpretation which, in his view, made “surplusage” of section 2(d).106 
Chief Justice Dickson contended, quite forcefully, that a failure to 
extend “effective protection to the interests to which the constitutional 
guarantee is directed” would render the freedom “legalistic, ungenerous, 
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  R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 
7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.) (modifying the common law rule in relation to s. 2(b) of the Charter, 
which treated secondary picketing as per se illegal). 
105
  See, e.g., R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) 
(defining freedom of religion); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”] (defining s. 2(b)); Motor Vehicle Reference, 
supra, note 97 (interpreting s. 7); and Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. 
No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) (interpreting s. 15). 
106
  Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 364 (S.C.C.). He added 
that “the express conferral of a freedom of association is unnecessary if all that is intended is to give 
effect to the collective enjoyment of other individual freedoms”. 
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indeed vapid”.107 Similarly, he dismissed the distinction between the 
form of an association and the objects or substance of its activities, and 
emphasized that associational behaviour may have no analogy in the 
actions of an individual acting alone.108 Unsuccessfully, he urged other 
members of the Court to recognize that freedom of association is a 
distinctive entitlement which requires a distinctive interpretation. 
B.C. Health Services rejected the abstract and generic approach 
which had crystallized in PIPSC’s four-point framework.109 Yet it was 
the content of the PIPSC definition of associational freedom, not an 
abstract concept of the right, that was problematic. Chief Justice 
Dickson’s reasons in the Alberta Reference illustrate the value of an 
abstract approach, and confirm that an interpretation that defines a 
guarantee’s underlying purposes need not preclude attention to context. 
Accordingly, after defining the entitlement, Dickson C.J.C. analyzed the 
circumstances of the case, and concluded that collective bargaining and 
the right to strike were protected by section 2(d). His analysis shows that 
B.C. Health Services was mistaken in assuming or implying that the 
Court must choose between the abstract and the contextual. An abstract 
approach which cannot take account of diverse contexts will present 
problems, but an approach that is purely contextual is not free from 
difficulty either.  
At the time of the Labour Trilogy, the Court feared section 2(d)’s 
consequences for labour relations, but also felt that “generic” collective 
activity could not be constitutionalized. Although a labour context was 
dominant in the key landmarks, it is difficult to tell whether those 
decisions gave associational freedom an individualist interpretation to 
prevent the constitutionalization of union activities, or whether the 
exclusion of labour activities was a by-product of the Court’s 
determination not to constitutionalize all associational activity. Both 
dynamics were present and, either way, the guarantee was trapped in an 
individualist definition.  
The “no go” zone for associational freedom, as it was called in B.C. 
Health Services, not only ensured the failure of most labour claims, but 
compromised section 2(d)’s opportunities on other questions as well. If 
McIntyre J.’s musings about the constitutional right to golf in a 
                                                                                                             
107
  Id., at 363. 
108
  Thus he noted, in the context of a right to strike, that “[t]he refusal to work by one 
individual does not parallel a collective refusal to work” because “[t]he latter is qualitatively rather 
than quantitatively different.” Id., at 367 (emphasis in original). 
109
  See supra, note 57. 
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foursome did not prove the point that virtually all human activity is 
social or associational,110 Wilson J.’s dissent in R. v. Skinner, which 
would have protected solicitation by prostitutes under section 2(d), 
showed the potential consequences of an uninhibited conception of 
entitlement.111 As a result, the only non-labour claim that has succeeded 
under section 2(d) was in Libman v. Quebec, where freedom of 
association rode section 2(b)’s coat-tails.112 Attempts to establish a claim 
in other settings, some of which were meritorious, consistently 
foundered.113  
Though more in theory than in practice, labour and non-labour 
entitlements co-existed in the first 20 years of section 2(d) jurisprudence. 
Labour claims may have dominated, but still the Court entertained non-
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  Alberta Reference, supra, note 106, at 408 (rejecting a definition of s. 2(d) which would 
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  [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.). In Wilson J.’s view it was 
inappropriate to exclude the solicitation of an act of prostitution from the scope of the guarantee 
simply because of “the purpose for which the parties seek to associate”; on that point, the Alberta 
Reference was clear that “[o]nly the coming together is protected.” Id., at 1249. Citing Irwin Toy, 
Wilson J. insisted that the logic that applies to s. 2(b) “also holds good for s. 2(d) of the Charter”. 
Id., at 1251. Meanwhile, Dickson C.J.C. rejected Wilson J.’s view, which seemed to suggest that 
every restriction on expression would violate s. 2(d), because expressive activity is communicative 
and for that reason inherently associational. The Chief Justice saw that such an unbridled conception 
of entitlement could constitutionalize any and all activity that is social in nature. 
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  [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.). In Libman a unanimous panel held 
that the province’s rules for third-party spending in referendum campaigns violated s. 2(b) and 2(d) 
of the Charter. Briefly, the legislation established national “yes” and “no” committees, and granted 
those committees the authority to incur “regulated expenditures”. Campaign spending outside the 
umbrella committees was permitted, but only to a maximum of $600. Otherwise, the legislation 
allowed those who preferred not to associate with either of the committees to “affiliate” instead. 
This option gave groups and individuals the opportunity to participate while maintaining some 
semblance of independence. 
Though the Court invalidated the scheme under s. 2(b), it found that Quebec’s referendum 
rules also violated s. 2(d), because provisions that infringed the expressive freedom of individuals 
also offended the rights of groups and organizations. As such, the spending limit fell squarely within 
the principle that the Charter protects associational freedom when a group or organization is 
prevented from exercising another fundamental freedom. While it invalidated the spending limit 
under both guarantees, the Court’s analysis drew entirely from the jurisprudence on freedom of 
expression.  
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  See, e.g., Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 27, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) (invoking the 
vocabulary of s. 2(d) — but not deciding the case on this ground — to support a conclusion that 
Law Society Rules prohibiting interprovincial law firms violated the mobility rights of lawyers); 
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) (rejecting a 
claim that an egg marketing scheme which excluded territorial participants violated s. 2(d) of the 
Charter, against a dissent based on s. 6 mobility rights); Suresh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
3 (S.C.C.) (declining to consider whether the Immigration Act’s criteria for deportation, which are 
based on an assumption of guilt by association, violate s. 2(d)); and Harper, [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) (finding no violation of s. 2(d) in federal campaign spending 
legislation).  
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labour claims. More recently, the Court’s decisions have favoured union 
interests. In that regard, the non-association cases were the first to signal 
a turn in the section 2(d) jurisprudence. Labour considerations emerged 
more emphatically than they had previously in Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U. 
and Advance Cutting & Coring, where the Court made explicit its 
solicitude for union security. And, as noted, a trend in favour of labour 
has become more pronounced in the McLachlin Court’s decisions. While 
Dunmore boosted labour’s prospects under the Charter,114 the decision 
has not had a favourable impact on positive rights under other 
guarantees.115 Meanwhile, though Pepsi-Cola was not a section 2(d) 
case, it was a breakthrough for labour which, like Dunmore, required the 
Court to give some of its own precedents an inventive interpretation.116 
Most notable, thus far, is B.C. Health Services, which dedicated its 
discussion of section 2(d) entirely to the constitutionalization of 
collective bargaining.  
Today, section 2(d) is at a juncture which makes it imperative to ask 
whether non-labour claims have any remaining traction. In raising that 
question for the future, three observations can be made. First of all, 
section 2(d) guarantees a fundamental Charter freedom, and does so in 
inclusive terms which draw no distinction between labour and non-
labour claims. A short digression, comparative in perspective, may be 
appropriate. Despite not being protected in the text of the constitution, 
freedom of association is regarded in the United States as one of the 
cornerstones of that country’s constitutional tradition. Accordingly, it is 
worth noting that the distinctions relied on in Charter jurisprudence to 
narrow the guarantee are not found in American doctrine. For instance, it 
does not particularly matter to the U.S. Supreme Court whether freedom 
of association is individual or collective in nature; neither does that 
Court draw a distinction between an association and its activities. 
Moreover, although labour issues play a role in the American 
jurisprudence, it is not a major or dominant role. To the contrary, 
protecting organizations from being targeted by the state, recognizing 
forms of intimate association and providing a check on compelled 
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association have been the U.S. Supreme Court’s primary concerns.117 
The point is that, while labour entitlements are one of the cornerstones of 
the guarantee in section 2(d), they neither define nor exhaust the scope 
of associational freedom.  
Second, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
set up a contest between abstract and contextual approaches to the 
interpretation of rights. For instance, the Court made it clear in B.C. 
Health Services that it was choosing between the two, and that 
“contextualizing” is superior to abstract thinking. Although this contest 
dates back to Edmonton Journal, the assumption that the Court must 
make a choice between the abstract and the contextual has never been 
convincing. It is not clear why a contextual approach must be promoted 
at the expense of abstract principles. Nor does it make sense to view 
abstract principles as innately flawed and a contextual approach as 
irrefutably valid. In addition, it is difficult to see how an entitlement can 
be defined solely in contextual terms, without reference to the 
underlying values and rationales which give it meaning outside and 
beyond the competing interests at stake in particular circumstances. For 
these reasons, any reconsideration of section 2(d) must examine the 
relationship between the abstract and the contextual, and define the roles 
each should play in constitutional interpretation. 
A third point is that B.C. Health Services failed to address or resolve 
the status of individual and collective entitlements under section 2(d). 
The early jurisprudence made the critical mistake of adopting an 
individualist conception of the entitlement and thereby excluding 
collective activity from the Charter. Now that Dunmore and B.C. Health 
Services have declared that section 2(d) protects at least some collective 
action, the Court may once again be tempted to engage in either-or 
thinking. The question is whether the recognition that section 2(d) 
includes collective activity necessarily means that there is no freedom of 
association for individuals under this guarantee. Here, too, it is essential, 
in rethinking how associational freedom should be defined, to ask 
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whether and to what extent freedom of association is both an individual 
and a collective entitlement. 
Much energy will be devoted to discussion of B.C. Health Services 
and its implications for labour relations. By constitutionalizing the 
activity and creating due process rights, B.C. Health Services marks a 
new era for collective bargaining in Canada. The decision also has the 
potential to lead to an invigorated and purposive interpretation of the 
Charter guarantee of associational freedom. For such an interpretation to 
emerge, care must be taken not to assume that the Court’s approach in 
B.C. Health Services — which was specific to the circumstances of 
collective bargaining — established a new methodology for section 2(d). 
In rethinking the meaning of associational freedom, it is important to 
return to the guarantee’s roots, which are found primarily in Dickson 
C.J.C.’s Alberta Reference dissent and in Bastarache J.’s discussion of 
its abstract values and purposes in Dunmore v. Ontario. That conception 
of entitlement, and not a case-by-case contextualization of the guarantee, 
holds the key to section 2(d)’s aspirations.  
Twenty years after the Labour Trilogy, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided to give section 2(d) of the Charter a second chance. 
Whatever the future holds for collective bargaining, B.C. Health 
Services is an exciting decision because it has, at last, created an 
opportunity for freedom of association to flourish. Developing a theory 
of entitlement for section 2(d) — one which can guide the evolution of 
the guarantee — is now a priority.  
